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JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h)
and rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ISSUE PRESENTED
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT
THE DEFENDANT APPELLEE'S EMPLOYMENT AS A
SCHOOL TEACHER SUBSEQUENT TO THE ENTRY OF
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE DID NOT CONSTITUTE A
SUBSTANTIAL
AND
MATERIAL
CHANGE
IN
CIRCUMSTANCE SUFFICEENT TO MODD7Y THE DECREE
OF DIVORCE, AS AMENDED.
Standard of Review; This issue is one which is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Determination by the trial court that there has been or there has not been a substantial change of
circumstances warranting the modification of award of alimony is generally presumed valid and thus
the Court of Appeals reviews such a ruling for an abuse of discretion. Wilde v. Wilde. 969 P.2d 438
(Utah App. 1998); Wells v. Wells. 871 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah App. 1994).
STATEMENT OF CASE
A.

Nature of Case.

This case is a domestic relations matter concerning alimony only. Dr. Gary V.
Petersen filed a Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce on October 9, 1995 asking that the court
terminate his alimony obligation. This appeal is from the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Order of August 10, 1998, following a bench trial on June 18, 1998.

B*

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below.

1.

On October 9, 1995, Dr. Petersen filed his Petition to Modify Decree of

Divorce requesting that his obligation to pay alimony in the amount of $2,000.00 per month be
terminated because the defendant, Julie A. Petersen, had obtained employment subsequent to the
entry of Decree of Divorce and was no longer in need of the alimony originally awarded. Record
("R")15-18.
2.

On October 26, 1995, Julie A. Petersen filed her Answer of Defendant to

Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce. R. 19-22.
3.
Heffernan.

A bench trial was held on June 18, 1998 before the Honorable Pamela G.

R. 176-310. At the close of trial and following oral argument by counsel, Judge

Heffernan made her ruling from the bench denying appellant's Petition to Modify "finding there has
not been a substantial change in circumstances." Trial Transcript ("T") 129. R.306.
4.

On August 10, 1998, the court entered its Order and Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law. R. 106-115.
5.

On October 9, 1998, the plaintiff filed a timely Motion for Extension of Time

to Appeal, Memorandum in Support of Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal, Affidavit of Randa
Buompensiero, Affidavit of Sandy Felkins, Affidavit of Michael K. Mohrman, Notice of Appeal and
Bond. R. 130-165.
6.

On October 20, 1998, the plaintiff filed his Notice to Submit for Decision

plaintiffs Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal. R. 168-170.
2

7.

On November 4, 1998, Judge Pamela G. Heffernan signed her decision

granting plaintiff s request for extension of time to appeal. R. 167.
8.

On October 30, 1998, plaintiff filed an Ex parte Motion for Enlargement of

Time to File Docketing Statement with the Utah Court of Appeals. Addenda ("A") 1.
9.

Plaintiff filed his Docketing Statement on November 13, 1998. A. 2.

C.

Statement of Facts.

1.

The parties were divorced pursuant to a Decree of Divorce entered on or about

November 4, 1993. A. 3.
2.

That Decree of Divorce was subsequently modified pursuant to order of the

Utah Court of Appeals. A document denominated "Amendment do Decree of Divorce" was
submitted to the court. It was not signed by the judge or entered. A. 4.
3.

The Decree of Divorce, as amended, provides for the payment by the plaintiff

to the defendant of the sum of $2,000.00 per month as and for permanent alimony to continue until
the earlier of defendant's death or remarriage. A. 4. Although the Amendment to Decree of Divorce
was never actually signed and entered by the court, it was signed and approved as to form by counsel
for both parties. A. 4. R. 16.
4.

The plaintiff is current in his payment of all alimony to the defendant. R. 107.

5.

The Decree of Divorce provided that the plaintiff was to pay $300.00 per

month per child for child support. All child support payments have been made and the children are
emancipated. None of the children are living with Mrs. Petersen. R. 107. T. 36. R. 213.
3

6.

At the date of the parties' divorce, the plaintiff was a practicing physician in

Ogden, Utah, in the field of internal medicine with earnings of approximately $100,000.00 per year.
Following the divorce, the plaintiff undertook additional training in the field of invasive cardiology.
The plaintiff currently practices in that field in Texarkana, Texas. The plaintiffs earnings have
increased substantially and the plaintiff isfinanciallyable to pay the $2,000.00 per month as and for
alimony to the defendant as previously ordered by the court. R. 107-108.
7.

At the time of the parties' divorce, the defendant was trained and educated

as a school teacher but had not practiced her profession for approximately twenty years. It was
determined at that time that it would be necessary for the defendant to recertify as a teacher in order
to secure a teaching position. The defendant was unemployed at the time of the divorce. The
alimony awarded the defendant was based, in part, upon the fact that the defendant was unemployed.
R. 108. See also, Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237, 239, 242-43 (Utah App. 1987).
8.

At the time of the parties' divorce, the defendant was trained and educated

as a school teacher but had not practiced her profession for approximately twenty years. It was
determined at that time that it would be necessary for the defendant to recertify as a teacher if she
were to secure a teaching position. In addition, she was unemployed at the time of the divorce. The
trial court found that her ability to obtain a teaching contract was "speculative". R. 109. See also,
Petersen v. Petersen at 242-243.
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9.

Immediately after the Decree of Divorce was entered the defendant recertified

as a school teacher and has been employed by the Weber County School District since the Decree
of Divorce was entered. She has a Masters Degree. T. 52-53. R. 229-30.
10.
R. 258.

For the school years of 1996-97 the defendant made almost $46,000. T. 81.

For the school year of 1997-98 the defendant anticipated that she would make

approximately $46,000 or $47,000, exclusive of alimony. T. 82. R. 259.
11.

The defendant, Julie Petersen, submitted itemized monthly expenses totaling

approximately $4,700.00 a month and the court made a factual finding that those were her expenses.
R. 110.
12.

The defendant, Julie Petersen, testified that at the time of the Decree of

Divorce her house payment was between $1,500 and $1,600 per month. T. 44. R. 221. She has
since refinanced the house and her monthly house payment is $1,179 per month. T. 33. R. 210.
13.

At the time the Decree of Divorce was entered she did not tithe to her church.

At the present time she does pay tithing to the LDS church. The amount stated on her itemized
expenses at trial was $620 per month. In actual fact, she testified that she tithed $450 a month. She
also testified that she tithed on her net income including her income as a school teacher and alimony.
T. 43-44. R. 220-21.
14.

She pays $285 per month on an insurance policy, of which she is the owner,

on the life of Dr. Gary Petersen. T. 38. R. 215.
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15.

Her itemized expenses show $200 per month for her daughter at Weber State

University and a housing expense for her son at Utah State University for $400. She testified at trial
that this $600 expense was not actually incurred. T. 37. R. 24.
16.

The defendant listed her monthly expense for food and household supplies

as $525 per month. She testified that number was based upon children living with her. She also
testified at trial that at the present there were no children living with her and that her monthly food
and household supply expense was somewhere between $400 and $500 per month. T. 36. R. 213.
17.

In 1995 the defendant received an inheritance of $50,000. At that time she

paid off all her debts. T. 27. R. 204. In addition, she put the remainder of those funds into CD's.
T. 28. R. 205. She deposited approximately $23,000. T. 28. R. 205.
18.

At the time the parties were divorced in November of 1983, the home, which

was awarded to the defendant, was valued at approximately $330,000. T. 48. R. 225. It has not
been reappraised.
19.

Mrs. Petersen owes approximately $90,000 on her home. T. 86. R. 263. She

lives alone in the home, which is 5,000 square feet. T. 86. R. 263.
20.

The defendant has state retirement income and contributes almost $7,500 per

yeartoher401(k). T. 81. R. 258.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT
THE DEFENDANT/APPELLEE'S EMPLOYMENT AS A
SCHOOL TEACHER SUBSEQUENT TO THE ENTRY OF
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE DID NOT CONSTITUTE A
SUBSTANTIAL
AND
MATERIAL
CHANGE
IN
CIRCUMSTANCE SUFFICIENT TO MODIFY THE DECREE
OF DIVORCE, AS AMENDED
The trial judge states in her conclusions of law:
2. That the Plaintiff has failed to meet his threshold burden to show
a substantial change in circumstances sufficient to modify the decree
of divorce as amended.
R. 110. This finding is an abuse of discretion and an error in law. The following facts are
undisputed. First, at the time the Decree of Divorce was entered the defendant, Julie Petersen, was
unemployed. The court assumed that re-employment as a school teacher would be speculative at
best. Since the Decree of Divorce was entered she has been employed as a school teacher in Weber
County for approximately sixteen years. She has had the opportunity to enjoy that income in
addition to the $2,000 per month alimony that Dr. Petersen was ordered to pay. In addition, she
received an inheritance in 1995 and paid off all of her debts save one, i.e. her home mortgage.
She has refinanced the house to the point where her monthly obligation is now
between $400 and $500 less than it was when the parties were married. She has deposited a
remaining portion of her inheritance in savings, approximately $23,000.

She contributes

substantially to her 401(k), in the amount of approximately $7,500 per year. She has well over
$50,000 in that account. She also participates in the Utah State Retirement System. She voluntarily
7

purchases life insurance on the appellant's life at a monthly cost of $285. She lives in a 5,000 square
foot home, which has an equity in excess of a quarter of a million dollars. She has no monthly
expenses except for those necessary to run her household and pay for her moderate mortgage
obligation. She earns in excess of $46,000 a year.
At the time the parties were divorced she was unemployed, had six children for which
the plaintiff was paying $1,800 per month in child support and was receiving $2,000 per month in
alimony. Alimony was based upon Dr. Petersen's ability to pay and Mrs. Petersen's need.
It is obvious that the circumstances that existed that the time the parties were
divorced have substantially and materially changed, and in a fashion not contemplated by the parties
at the time the decree was entered.
Two Utah cases are specifically relevant to this case. The case of Petersen v.
Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1987), (which, in fact, is the appellate court decision in this
matter requiring the payment of $2,000 per month in alimony) and Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugh. 786
P.2d 241 (Utah App. 1990).
In footnote 5 on page 243 of Petersen, supra, the court states in part:
Of course, it would be proper for the district court to readjust the
amount of alimony awarded to Mrs. Petersen if at any point in time
there develops a material change in circumstances, such as Mrs.
Petersen securing gainful employment....
Italics original, emphasis added. Petersen, supra at 243.
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In Bridenbaugh. a case remarkably similar to the matter at hand, this court affirmed
the trial court's termination of alimony where the wife obtained a master's degree in social work,
became employed with the Granite School District as a social worker for fourteen years, earning
approximately $16,200 a year and where the husband, who at the time the decree of divorce was
entered, was earning approximately $30,000 a year, and, who at the time of the appeal, was then
earning $240,000 per year. The court terminated the wife's alimony based upon the substantial
change in circumstances, which consisted, in part, of her employment as a social worker in the
Granite School District.
The long and the short of it is, the plaintiff has met his burden of establishing a
substantial and material change in circumstances.

Furthermore, the substantial change of

circumstance warrants that the plaintiffs alimony obligation be terminated.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT
THE DEFENDANT/APPELLEE'S EMPLOYMENT AS A
SCHOOL TEACHER SUBSEQUENT TO THE DECREE OF
DIVORCE DID NOT CONSTITUTE A SUBSTANTIAL
MATERIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCE SUFFICIENT TO
MODIFY THE DECREE OF DIVORCE, AS AMENDED,
In 1987, when this court entered its decision on Dr. Petersen's initial appeal, it
determined that Mrs. Petersen was entitled to $2,000 per month in permanent alimony in addition
to the $1,800 per month she would receive as child support for the parties' six children then residing
with her. This court observed that Dr. Petersen was capable of earning $100,000 per year while Mrs.

9

Petersen's ability to obtain recertification and secure a teaching contract was actually speculative.
Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237, 239 (Utah App. 1987). In addition, in commenting upon its
award of $2,000 per month in alimony this court made the following observation in footnote 5 on
page 243 of the decision: "Of course, it would be proper for the district court to readjust the amount
of alimony awarded to Mrs. Petersen if at any point in time their develops a material change of
circumstances, such as Mrs. Petersen securing gainful employment. . . ." Id. at 243. It is obvious
that this court felt that subsequent employment by Mrs. Petersen would constitute a material change
in circumstance such that an evaluation of the alimony award should be reconsidered. Mrs. Petersen
was employed almost immediately after the Decree of Divorce was entered in November of 1983
and has been employed on a continuing basis ever since. She now makes almost $50,000 per year.
The following facts are relevant to an analysis as to whether or not Mrs. Petersen's
employment subsequent to the entry of the Decree of Divorce constitutes a substantial and material
change of circumstance warranting termination or reduction in the alimony award. First, at the time
the Decree of Divorce was entered, she was unemployed.

Second, she subsequently became

certified and obtained her Masters Degree. At the time of the divorce, she had six children living
with her. All six of the parties children are now emancipated and none are living with the defendant.
Her current income of between $46,000 and $47,000 per year is almost half of the parties' income
at the time they were divorced.
The defendant has enjoyed a substantial increase in her net worth. She has substantial
savings, equity in the parties' home, and retirement accounts. She has reached the point in time
10

where she has virtually no bills except those associated with her mortgage obligation and her
personal expenses.
Dr. Petersen, for his part, has also enjoyed a substantial increase in his ability to earn
income and in his net worth. For purposes of the trial in this matter, he conceded that he has the
ability to continue to pay alimony.
Therefore, the question before this court is almost identical to the question that was
before this court in the matter of Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugk 786 P.2d 241 (Utah App. 1990). The
question is whether there was a sufficient material change in Mrs. Petersen's economic
circumstances to justify the termination of Dr. Petersen's alimony. The facts in Bridenbaugh are
remarkably similar to those in this case. In Bridenbaugh the parties were divorced in 1965 after a
ten year marriage. They had two children for which Mr. Bridenbaugh was ordered to pay child
support at the rate of $150 per child. Also, he was ordered to pay $400 per month as alimony to
Mrs. Bridenbaugh.

At the time the decree was entered Mrs. Bridenbaugh was unemployed.

Subsequent to the decree of divorce she obtained her Masters Degree in social work and thereafter
began work in the Granite School District as a social worker. She worked at that job for fourteen
years. Mr. Bridenbaugh then filed a petition to modify the decree of divorce specifically for the
purpose of terminating her alimony. In 1987, Mrs. Bridenbaugh was earning approximately $16,200
from her employment, $4,600 from her alimony payments and an additional $5,800 from certain
interest, dividends and mutual fund earnings. Mr. Bridenbaugh, on the other hand, who in 1965 had
been earning approximately $30,000 a year for the benefit of a family of four was now earning
11

approximately $240,000 per year and had a net worth of about two and one-half million dollars. Id.
at 242. This court affirmed the trial court's findings that the circumstances surrounding Mrs.
Bridenbaugh's employment and improved financial condition constituted a substantial change in
circumstances warranting termination of the alimony award. The court stated:
The appropriate test to determine whether the termination in alimony
was appropriate is whether [Mrs. Bridenbaugh] is now able to
provide for herself a standard of living which is equal to that enjoyed
during the marriage of the parties. We conclude that there is
substantial evidence supporting the court's finding that plaintiff can
now live at a level which is at least equal to that enjoyed during the
marriage. Therefore, the court did not err in terminating alimony.
Concomitantly, there was no error in denying an increase in alimony,
as the purpose of alimony is to allow the recipient spouse a standard
of living as close as possible to that experienced during the marriage,
not to provide subsequent improvements to keep pace with those of
the payor spouse.
Id. at 243. For purposes of legal analysis, Bridenbaugh is virtually identical to the case at hand.
Mrs. Petersen, at present, makes between 46 and 47 percent of the total family
income earned by Dr. Petersen to support a family of eight at the time the parties were divorced.
However, she can utilize that entire income of approximately $46,000 to $47,000 per year for her
own support. By her own admission, she paid off all of her bills in 1995. She has savings of not less
than $23,000 in various CD's. She has in excess of $50,000 in a 401(k) retirement account. She has
no obligation for the support of any person other than herself. She owns a home with substantial
equity. It is obvious that she is capable of providing for herself a standard of living that is equal to
or better than the standard of living that she enjoyed at the time that the parties were divorced.
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As general principal, because Dr. Petersen is seeking to modify the prior alimony
award it is his burden to establish that there has been a substantial change of circumstances which
justifies that modification. Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438 (Utah App. 1998); Wells v. Wells. 871
P.2d 1036 (Utah App. 1994); Paffel v. PaffeL 732 P.2d 96 (Utah App. 1986); and Maughan v.
Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989).
In general, Dr. Petersen must also show Mrs. Petersen is able to support herself in
a standard of living to which she was accustomed during the period that the parties were married.
See Fullmer v. Fullmer. 761 P.2d 942, 951 (Utah App. 1988). In the 1982 case of Haslam v.
Haslam. 657 P.2d 757 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court determined that the husband met his
burden of showing that there was a substantial change in circumstances when it was determined that
the wife had obtained employment after the divorce and where her income had increased
substantially. Interestingly, in Haslam the court also made the observation that the husband had
retired and his income had remained the same.

However, in the case of Bridenbaugh v.

Bridenbaugh. this court dismissed the fact that the husband had increased his ability to earn income
eightfold (approximately the same increase as in this case).
The trial court's finding that Mrs. Petersen's employment subsequent to the Decree
of Divorce and subsequent improvement in her financial condition was not a material change in
circumstances warranting termination or reduction in her alimony was either a misunderstanding or
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error to the appellate or it was a
clear abuse of discretion.
13

Dr. Petersen has clearly met his burden of showing that the trial court failed to
apprehend the facts in such a fashion as to properly apply Utah law. Specifically, the facts as
articulated above do constitute a material change in circumstance as specifically set out by this court
in the case of Bridenbaugh v. Bridenbaugh. 786 P.2d 241 (Utah App. 1990) and as anticipated by
this court in the case of Petersen v. Petersen. 737 P.2d 237 (Utah App. 1987).
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this court reverse the trial court's determination
that there was no material change of circumstances sufficient to warrant termination of alimony and
remand to the trial court with instructions to enter an order consistent with its ruling.
Respectfully submitted this ^—day

of

CA^Y'(

, 1999.

RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON
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Clark W. Sessions
CLYDE, SNOW, SESSIONS & SWENSON
One Utah Center
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Paul M. Belnap, Esq.
STRONG &HANNI
Sixth Floor Boston Building
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

13112-001
246152

15

Tabl

ORIGINAL
PAUL M. BELNAP [A0279]
STRONG &HANNI
Sixth Floor Boston Building
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Telephone: (801) 532-7080
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MICHAEL K. MOHRMAN [A4094]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506
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JuteffAlesandro
Clerk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
GARY V. PETERSEN,
EX PARTE ORDER ENLARGING TIME
WITHIN WHICH TO FILE DOCKETING
STATEMENT

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
JULIE A. PETERSEN,

Appellate No. 981652-CA

Defendant/Appellee.
Based upon appellant's ex parte motion and good cause appearing, it is hereby
ordered that the appellant may have to and including November 13, 1998 within which tofilehis
docketing statement.
DATED this 5r

day of f)rU£MUU

.1998.
THE COURT:

Tt}e\Hott<orabta dltU- &\ rH';

"^^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on November 5, 1998, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States
mail to the parties listed below:
PAUL M BELNAP
STRONG & HANNI
9 EXCHANGE PL STE 600
600 BOSTON BLDG
SALT LAKE CITY UT. 8 4111
MICHAEL K MOHRMAN
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER & NELSON
50 S MAIN #700
PO BOX 2465
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CLYDE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON
201 S MAIN ST 13TH FLR
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101

Dated this November 5, 199?

By ./
Deputy Clerk
Case No. 981652
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PAUL M. BELNAP [A0279]
STRONG &HANN1
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
and
MICHAEL K. MOHRMAN [A4094]
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465
Telephone: (801) 531-2000
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
GARY V. PETERSEN,
DOCKETING STATEMENT
Plaintiff/Appellant,

vs.

Appellate No. 981652-CA

JULIE A. PETERSEN,
Defendant/Appellee.
Appellant, Gary V. Petersen, through his undersigned counsel and pursuant to
Rule 9 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits the following Docketing Statement in
connection with this appeal.
1.

DATE OF ORDER APPEALED FROM: The date of the Order sought to

be reviewed is August 10, 1998, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "A". The trial court's

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered the same date, an unsigned copy of which
is attached as Exhibit "B".
2.

NATURE OF POST JUDGMENT MOTIONS AND DATES FILED: No

motion has been filed pursuant to rules 50(a) and (b), 52(b), 54(b), or 59 Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
3.

DATE OF FILING NOTICE OF APPEAL: Notice of Appeal was filed on

October 9, 1998. A Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal, Memorandum in Support of
Motion for Extension of Time to Appeal, affidavits, and Undertaking on Appeal were also filed
on October 9, 1998. On November 4, 1998 the trial court granted plaintiff's request for
extension of time to appeal.
4.

JURISDICTION: This court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h).
5.

NAME OF TRIAL COURT: This appeal is from final orders entitled

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order which were signed on July 30, 1998, and
entered on August 10, 1998 in the Second Judicial District Court in and for Weber County.
6.

STATEMENT OF FACTS:
(a)

The parties were divorced pursuant to a Decree of Divorce entered

on or about November 4, 1993. That Decree of Divorce was subsequently modified
pursuant to Order of the Utah Court of Appeals.
(b)

The Decree of Divorce, as amended, provides for the payment by
2

the plaintiff to the defendant of the sum of $2,000 00 per month as and for permanent
alimony to continue until the earlier of defendant's death or remarriage.
(c)

The plaintiff is current in the payment of all alimony to the

(d)

That the Decree of Divorce also provided that the plaintiff pay

defendant.

$300.00 per month per child for child support. All child support payments have been
made.
(e)

Each of the parties' six children is emancipated.

(f)

At the date of the parties' divorce, the plaintiff was a practicing

physician in Ogden, Utah, in the field of internal medicine with earnings of
approximately $100,000.00 per year. Following the divorce, the plaintiff undertook
additional training in the field of invasive cardiology. The plaintiff currently practices in
that field in Texarkana, Texas. The plaintiffs earnings have increased substantially and
the plaintiff is financially able to pay the $2,000.00 per month as and for alimony to the
defendant as previously ordered by the court.
(g)

At the time of the parties' divorce, the defendant was trained and

educated as a school teacher but had not practiced her profession for approximately
twenty years. It was determined at that time that it would be necessary for the defendant
to re-certify as a teacher in order for her to secure a teaching position. The defendant was
unemployed at the time of the divorce. The alimony awarded to the defendant was based,
3

in part, upon the fact that the defendant was unemployed.
(h)

Following the parties divorce, the defendant did in fact become re-

certified and has been employed by the Weber County School District since the Decree
of Divorce was entered. The trial court found that the defendant, under her contract
which is renegotiated and renewed on a year to year basis, has had earnings of
$39,200.00 in 1996 and $40,400.00 in 1997. She is a participant in a State of Utah
retirement plan and a 401(k) plan through her employer, to which she is a contributing
participant.
(i)

In 1995, the defendant received approximately $51,000.00 as an

annuity and approximately $17,000.00 in cash as a result of the death of her mother and
she paid income tax on the annuity portion of the inheritance in the approximate amount
of $18,000.00. In the original Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court
determined:
"that while the defendant is a college graduate with a Bachelor's
Degree and is trained as a school teacher, she is not currently
certificated and will require additional training to become
certificated. In addition, the court finds that if certificated,
defendant's ability to produce income would approximate onefourth (1/4) to one-fifth (1/5) that of the plaintiff in the event she
could secure a teaching contract which is speculative at best.
Further, the courtfindsthat the express intention of the defendant
is to pursue an education in afieldother than teaching."
(j)

Trial was held before the Honorable Pamela G. Heffeman on

Thursday, June 18, 1998.
4

(k)

In the Findings of Fact, entered on August 10, 1998, Judge

Heffernan determined that:
12. That the circumstances of the defendant have not substantially
changed since the entry of the Decree of Divorce herein i.e., she
resides in the same residence that was the parties' marital
residence at the date of divorce; her basic expenses have not
substantially or materially changed; she has accepted and
continuously pursued her employment in order to meet her
monthly expenses and provide for her support and maintenance
and that she has not received and retained substantial funds by way
of gift of inheritance which have altered or affected her
circumstances significantly.
(Emphasis added).
(1)

In the Conclusions of Law entered on August 10, 1998, Judge

Heffernan concluded:
2. That the plaintiff has failed to meet his threshold burden to
show a substantial change in circumstances sufficient to modify
the decree of divorce as amended.
3. That plaintiffs Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce should be
denied.
7.

ISSUE FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW: The issue

presented by this appeal is whether or not the trial court erred when it determined that the
circumstances of the defendant had not substantially changed since the entry of the decree of
divorce. In particular, was it error for the trial court to determine that the circumstances of the
defendant had not materially or substantially changed since the entry of the Decree of Divorce
even though she subsequently obtained employment as a school teacher. This issue is solely a
5

question of law, with no deference to be given to the trial court's decision, and is reviewed for
correctness. See State v Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991); Barnes v Barnes. 857 P 2d
257, 262 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Allred v. Allred. 797 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
8.

DETERMINATIVE LAW: Petersen v. Petersen. 737 P.2d 237 (Utah App.

1987); Bridenbaueh v. Bridenbaueh. 786 P.2d 241 (Utah App. 1990).
9.

RELATED APPEAL: There has been one prior appeal in this case,

Petersen v. Petersen. 737 P. 2d 237 (Utah App. 1987).
10.

ATTACHMENT: A. Order; B. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

DATED this / g ^ a y of /VW^t^A^<1998.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER
& NELSON

6

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copyy^f the foregoing instrument
instrun
was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this / ^ day of pjyt/A—v^^
1998,
tothe
%
following:
Clark W. Sessions
CLYDE, SNOW, SESSIONS & SWENSON
One Utah Center
201 South Main, 13 th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Paul M. Belnap
STRONG &HANNI
Sixth Floor, Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

13112-001
226450
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Clark W. Sessions, Esq.
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SESSIONS & MOORE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
300 First Federal Plaza
505 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah
84102
Telephone: (801) 359-4100
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
GARY V. PETERSON,
DECREE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 83079
JULIE A. PETERSON,
Defendant.
oooOooo—
The above-entitled matter having come on regularly for
trial before the Honorable Calvin Gould, one of the judges of the
above-entitled

court

on

the

7th

day

of

continuing thereafter on October 11, 1983.

October,

1983

and

The Plaintiff Gary V.

Peterson was present and represented by Pete N. Vlahos of Vlahos,
Perkins & Sharp, Plaintiff's attorneys.
Peterson was

present

in person

and

The Defendant Julie A.

represented

by

Sessions of Sessions & Moore, Defendant's attorneys.

Clark W.

The parties

were duly sworn and examined in support of the Complaint and
Counterclaim on file herein.

The Court heard and received the
i

stipulation of the parties concerning certain matters and oral
and

documentary

evidence

and

after

taking

the

matter

under
3> l T . ^
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advisement, issued its Memorandum Decision on the 18th day of
October, 1983 and being fully advised in the premises and having
made and entered its FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
NOW,

THEREFORE,

it

is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED

AND

DECREED as follows:
1.

That the Plaintiff and the Defendant be and they are

hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce each from the other on the
grounds

of mental cruelty,

dissolving

the bonds of matrimony

heretofore existing between the parties, said divorce to become
final upon its entry herein and any and all applicable waiting
periods

in

connection

therewith,

including

the

interlocutory

period, be and the same are hereby waived.
2.

That the Defendant be and she is hereby awarded the

care, custody and control of the six (6) minor children of the
parties, to-wit:

Erick Scott born January 9, 1966; Cami Lyn born

April 17, 1970; Stephanie Ann born December 4, 1970; Tifani Jill
born November 30, 1972; Ryan Mathew born October 1, 1975; and
Andrea Kay born November 9, 1977 and the Plaintiff be and he is
hereby awarded reasonable rights of visitation at all reasonable
times and places provided that the Plaintiff is hereby ordered to
give to the Defendant prior notice of the Plaintiff's exercise of
visitation rights and that the Plaintiff shall accommodate the
requests of the minor children for and in connection with the
exercise of such visitation rights as their respective schedules,
activities and best interests dictate.

Further, the Plaintiff is

awarded visitation rights of and with said minor children every

-2-
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other

weekend

and

alternating

I

holiday

and

vacation

periods

hereafter.
3.

That the Plaintiff be and he is hereby ordered to pay

to the Defendant the sum of Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) per
month per child as and for child support, a total of One Thousand
Eight Hundred Dollars

($1,800.00) per month to continue until

such children reach the age of eighteen (18) years or graduate
from high school if later.
4.

That

the Plaintiff be and he is hereby awarded the

right to claim Erick Scott, Cami Lyn, Stephanie Ann Tifani Jill,
Ryan Mathew and Andrea Kay

as exemptions

and deductions

for

Federal and State income tax purposes for the taxable year 1983
and taxable years following the entry of the Decree of Divorce
herein.
5.

That the Defendant is awarded and the Plaintiff be and

he is hereby ordered to pay to the Plaintiff commencing on the
first day of November, 1983 and continuing on the first day of
each calendar month thereafter, the sum of One Thousand Dollars
($1,000.00) per month permanent alimony to continue until the
earlier of the Defendant's

death or remarriage at which time

alimony shall cease and no longer be payable.
6.
he

That the Defendant is awarded and the Plaintiff be and

is hereby ordered

to pay

to the Plaintiff as a lump-sum

property settlement award, the sum of One Hundred Twenty Thousand
Dollars

($120,000.00) payable in equal monthly installments of

-3-
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One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) each without interest from the
date of entry hereof until paid,
7.

That the Defendant be and she is hereby awarded as her

sole and separate property, without claim from the Plaintiff, the
parties' residence, real property and adjacent lot known as and
located

at

6039

Breeze

Circle,

Ogden,

Utah,

subject

to

the

existing first mortgage obligation thereon, which the Defendant
is ordered to assume, pay and discharge and hold the Plaintiff
harmless therefrom.
8.

That the Defendant be and she is hereby awarded as her

sole and separate property, without claim from the Plaintiff, the
furniture,

furnishings,

fixtures,

appliances

and

personal

property located in and at the residence, real property and lot
hereinabove described, provided however, the Plaintiff be and he
is hereby

awarded as his sole and separate property, without

claim from the Defendant, the parties' wooden secretary bookcase,
video camera and lighting system, yellow overstuffed chair and
ottoman and the parties' coffee table located in the parties'
family room at said residence.
9.

That the Defendant be and she is hereby awarded as her

sole and separate property, without claim from the Plaintiff, the
parties'

1977

Surburban

vehicle

and

the

parties'

Datsun

automobile currently being used by the parties' children.
10.

That the Defendant be and she is hereby awarded as her

sole and separate property, without claim from the Plaintiff,
existing

life

insurance

on

the Plaintiff's

-4-
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Defendant

is

the

owner

of

I

such

policies.

Such

award

shall

include but shall not be limited to, the right to receive cash
values

therefrom,

designate

beneficiaries

thereunder

and

all

rights, duties and responsibilities appurtenant thereto.
11.

That the Defendant be and she is hereby awarded one

half (%) of the parties' interest in and to a partnership and
investment known as J&E Associates, a partnership, without claim
from the Plaintiff.
12.

That the Defendant be and she is hereby awarded any and

all interest in and to any pension, profit sharing, retirement or
similar plan or benefit, to which she may become entitled by
reason of her future employment or otherwise, without claim from
the Plaintiff.
13.

That the Plaintiff be and he is hereby awarded as his

sole and separate property, without claim from the Defendant, all
right, title and interest in and to Gary V. Peterson, M.D., a
professional corporation.
14.

That the Plaintiff be and he is hereby awarded as his

sole and separate property, without claim from the Defendant, all
right,

title and

sharing

interest

contributions,

in and

rights

and

to all pension
benefits,

now

and profit
existing

or

hereafter acquired by or vested in the Plaintiff in the Gary V.
Peterson,

M.D.,

a

professional

sharing

and retirement

similar

pension,

profit

plans

pension,

profit

and any future interest

in any

sharing

corporation,

or

retirement 'plan

through Plaintiff's employment or otherwise.

-5-
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15.

That the Plaintiff be and he is hereby awarded as his

sole and separate property, without claim from the Defendant, any
and all interest in and to that certain X-ray machine and related
equipment, supplies and accessories, currently the subject of a
family trust known as the Gary V, Peterson Family Irrevocable
Trust, including the right to revoke said trust in the event the
same is revocable.
and

The Plaintiff is further awarded as his sole

separate property, without

claim from

the Defendant,

the

parties' right, title and interest in and to the real property,
improvements
property

and

furniture,

fixtures, appliances

and personal

located

in and at

the Yorkshire Condominium, Ogden,

Utah, the parties' condominium at 4956 Quail Lane, Ogden, Utah
and the rental residence and real property located at 580 28th
Street, Ogden, Utah and the Plaintiff be and he is hereby ordered
to assume, pay and discharge any and all obligations existing in
connection

with

said

property,

improvements

and

personal

properties and hold the Defendant harmless therefrom.
16.

That the Plaintiff be and he is hereby awarded as his

sole and separate property, the parties' boat, motor and trailer,
one half (%) of the parties' interest in J&E Investments, a Utah
partnership, the parties1 Biomass Partnership interest, Peterson
Land

Development

acquired

by

the

and

the Knowlwood

Plaintiff

Condominium,

following

the

Ogden, Utah,

separation

of

the

parties' and all furniture, furnishings, fixtures and appliances
located therein and thereat, without claim from the Defendant,
provided however, the Plaintiff is ordered

-6-
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discharge any and all obligations connected therewith and hold
the Defendant harmless therefrom.
17.

That the Plaintiff be and he is hereby awarded the

undivided one seventh (1/7) interest in and to the parties1 Bear
Lake property (the subject of the Plaintiff1 s parents' Trust) and
the Defendant be and she is hereby ordered and directed to convey
her undivided one seventh (1/7) interest therein to the parties'
youngest minor child Andrea Kay, as Beneficiary, pursuant to the
same terms, provisions and conditions as each of the other minor
children own a one seventh (1/7) interest therein and thereto.
18.

That each of the parties are awarded their own personal

effects, wearing apparel, jewelry and personal property currently
in their possession without claim from the other.
19.

That the parties be and they are hereby ordered to file

Federal and State income tax returns for the calendar year 1983
on such bases as are in the best interests of the parties and
each party

is ordered

to pay

that

portion

of

any

such tax

assessment and obligation attributable to the parties on the same
ratio that each such parties income bears to the total income of
the parties and in the event of any refund, rebate or allowance
such shall be divided between the parties on a like basis.
20.
pay,

That the Plaintiff and he is hereby ordered to assume,

discharge

and

hold

the

Defendant

harmless

from,

the

following debts and obligations incurred during the course of the
marriage of the parties:

-7-
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A.

The

existing

second

mortgage

on

the

parties'

residence and real property located at 6039 Breeze Circle,
Ogden, Utah, in the approximate sum of Forty-Four Thousand
Dollars ($44,000.00);
B.

The existing loan secured by a third mortgage on

the parties' residence and real property located at 6039
Breeze Circle, Ogden, Utah, in favor of Gary V. Peterson,
M.D., pension and profit sharing plan in the approximate sum
of Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000,00) and other loans, if
any, made

to

the Plaintiff

by

said

pension

and

profit

sharing plan;
C.
the

An existing open account obligation to Texaco in

approximate

sum

of

Three

Hundred

Fifty

Dollars

($350.00);
D.

The September

and October,

1983

first mortgage

payments on the parties' residence and real property at 6039
Breeze

Circle,

utility

bills,

Ogden,

Utah,

obligations

together
and

with

accounts

in

outstanding
connection

therewith;
E.

Outstanding open account charges incurred by the

parties for children's clothing and accessories necessary
for the children's enrollment in public schools for the 1983
school year; and
F*

All personal expenses and obligations incurred for

the benefit of the Plaintiff since the separation of the
parties.

-8-
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That

the Defendant

be and she is hereby ordered to

assume, pay, discharge and hold the Plaintiff harmless from, the
following bills and obligations incurred during the course of the
parties' marriage:
A.

All open accounts, charge accounts

and similar

obligations not hereinabove specifically ordered to be paid
by the Plaintiff;
B.

All debts, obligations and charges incurred for

the use and benefit of the Defendant since the separation of
the parties, including loans from the Defendant's parents
and other relatives.
22.

That

the Plaintiff

be and he is hereby

ordered to

provide at his sole cost and expense, health, accident, medical
and dental insurance on and for the benefit of the parties1 six
(6) minor children, during his obligation of support thereof,
provided however, the Plaintiff shall be allowed the right to
schedule

dental

children

other

ordered

and medical
than

services

emergency

to cooperate with

for

services

the parties' minor

and

the Plaintiff

the Defendant

in every

obtaining, securing and scheduling such services.

is

respect in
Each of the

parties are ordered to assume, pay and discharge any and all
obligations for such medical and dental services not covered by
such insurance on an equal basis.
23.
to

That each of the parties be and they are hereby ordered

assume,

pay

and

discharge

their

-9-

own

costs

and

expenses

incurred in connection with the above-entitled action, including
attorney's fees.
24.

That each of the parties are hereby ordered to execute

such deeds, conveyances, bills of sale and other documents as may
be necessary to transfer the property as awarded by the Court to
the party entitled thereto.

DATED this ^ y L d a y

ot^Wf^^
BY THE COURT:

CaWin Gould
D i s t r i c t Judge
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Clark W. Sessions (2914)
SESSIONS & MOORE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
400 First Federal Plaza
505 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 359-4100

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
GARY V. PETERSON,
Plaintiff,

vs.
JULIE A. PETERSON,
Defendant.

:
i:

AMENDMENT TO
DECREE OF DIVORCE

:

Civil No. 83079

i
:

The above-entitled matter was presented to the undersigned,
one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court pursuant to the
remand of the Utah Court of Appeals in Peterson v. Peterson, Case
No. 860007-CA filed May 18, 1987.

The Plaintiff was represented

by his attorney of record, Paul M. Belnap of Strong & Hanni, and
the Defendant was represented by Clark W. Sessions of Sessions &
Moore, her attorneys.

The Court reviewed the opinion of the Utah

Court of Appeals and being otherwise fully advised in the
premises hereby orders as follows:
1.

That paragraph 5. of the Decree of Divorce entered

herein be and the same is hereby deleted and the following
substituted therefor.

That the Defendant is awarded and the Plaintiff be and
he is hereby ordered to pay to the Plaintiff commencing
on the first day of November, 1983, and continuing on
the first day of each calendar month thereafter, the
sum of Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) permanent
alimony to continue to the earlier of the Defendant's
death or remarriage at which time alimony shall cease
and no longer be payable.
2.

That paragraph 6. of the Decree of Divorce entered

herein be and the same is hereby deleted in its entirety,
3.

That all other terms, provisions, conditions and

limitations contained in the Decree of Divorce entered herein
shall remain in full force and effect to the extent the same are
not in conflict herewith.
DATED

this

day of

, 1987.

BY THE COURT:

DISTRICT JUDGE
APPR

\Jinla UrtbO n&HA

teusfc
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CLARK W. SESSIONS
Attorney for Defendant
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CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914)
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215
Telephone: (801) 537-5555
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH

GARY V. PETERSEN,

ORDER
Plaintiff,

v.

Civil No. 824983079

JULIE A. PETERSEN,
Judge Pamela G. Heffernan
Defendant.
The

Petition

Plaintiff

herein

to Modify
came

on

Decree
regularly

of

Divorce
for

trial

filed

by the

before

the

undersigned, one of the judges of the above-entitled Court on
Thursday, June 18, 1998.

The Plaintiff was present in person and

represented by Michael K. Mohrman of Richards, Brandt, Miller &
Nelson, his attorneys.

The Defendant was present in person and

represented by Clark W. Sessions of Campbell Maack & Sessions, her
attorneys.

The Court heard and considered the evidence adduced,

the arguments and statements of counsel, and having heretofore made
and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, hereby
ORDERS as follows:

1.

That the Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce be and the

same is hereby denied, and
2.

That counsel for the Defendant be and he is hereby

granted leave to file an application for attorneys' fees and costs
incurred herein by way of affidavit for further consideration by
the Court and the Plaintiff, by and through his counsel, be and he
is hereby granted leave to file such opposition thereto as he shall
deem necessary, following which the matter may be submitted to the
Court for determination.
DATED this

day of

District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I herewith certify that I am a member of and/or employed by
the law firm of CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS, One Utah Center,
Thirteenth Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah

and

that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the foregoing ORDER was served upon the plaintiff by
placing a true and correct copy thereof in the U. S. mail, postage
prepaid, to the following this r y H

day of June, 1998:

Michael K. Mohnaan, Esq.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2000
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'ICLARK W. SESSIONS (2914)
!i CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215
Telephone: (801) 537-5555
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THB SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

GARY V. PETERSEN,
Plaintiff,

v.

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 824983079

JULIE A. PETERSEN,
Judge Pamela G. Heffernan
Defendant.
The

Petition

[Plaintiff

herein

to Modify
came

on

Decree of
regularly

Divorce
for

trial

filed

by the

before

the

undersigned, one of the judges of the above-entitled Court on
Thursday, June 18, 1998.

The Plaintiff was present in person and

Represented by Michael K. Mohrman of Richards, Brandt, Miller &
Nelson, his attorneys.

The Defendant was present in person and

Represented by Clark W. Sessions of Campbell Maack & Sessions, her
attorneys.

The Court having heard and considered the evidence

adduced, the arguments and statements of counsel, now makes and
enters the following:

I

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

,

That the parties were divorce pursuant to a Decree of i

Divorce entered on or about the 4ch day of November, 1993, which was
subsequently modified as mandated by the Utah Court of Appeals.
I

2.

That the Decree of Divorce as amended, provides for the

payment by the Plaintiff to the Defendant of the sum of $2,000 per
month as and for permanent alimony to continue to the earlier of
Defendant's death or remarriage.
3.

That the Plaintiff is current in the payment of all

alimony to the Defendant as ordered by the Court.
4.

That the Decree of Divorce provided in addition for the

payment of $300.00 per month per child as and for child support. I
Further, all required child support payments have been made.
5.

That each of the parties' six children is emancipated.

6.

That at the date of the parties' divorce, the Plaintiff

was a practicing physician in Ogden, Utah, in the field of internal i
medicine

with

earnings

of

approximately

$100,000

per

I

year. '

Following the divorce, the Plaintiff undertook additional training ,
in the field of invasive cardiology which he currently practices in

I
J the State of Texas.

•
Additionally, the Plaintiff's earnings have

I increased to $300,000 gross income in 1995; $499,000 gross income
|in 1996; and $735,000 gross income in 1997. The Court specifically
finds that the Plaintiff is financially able to pay the $2,ooo per
i

I
2

month as and for alimony to the Defendant as heretofore ordered by
the Court.
7.

That at the time of the parties' divorce, the Defendant

was trained and educated as a school teacher but had not practiced
her profession for approximately 20 years and that it would be
necessary for her to re-certify as a teacher in order for her to
secure a teaching position.
j

8.

That immediately

following the parties' divorcef the

Defendant did in fact become recertified and has been employed by
ithe Weber County School District since the Decree of Divorce was
entered.

Further, the Court finds that the Defendant under her

contract which is renegotiated and renewed on a year-to-year basis,
she had earnings of $39,200 in 1996; earnings of $40,400 in 1997;
and anticipates earnings of $41,800 in 1998. Additionally, she is
a participant in a retirement plan on a state level and a 401(k)
plan

through

her

employer

to

which

she

is

a

contributing

participant•
9.

That

in

1995,

the

Defendant

received

approximately

|$51,000 as an annuity and approximately $17,000 in cash as a result
of the death of her mother Julia G. Theurer and that the Defendant
paid income tax on the annuity portion of the inheritance in the
approximate amount of $18,000 and further that the balance of said
amounts other than approximately $20,000 which remains, was spent
by the Defendant on various debts and obligations, incl-ding but

ii

il

3

not

limited

to,

counseling

fees

for

the

parties'

children,

improvements to the marital residence and the acquisition, jointly
with adjacent neighbors, of property to the rear of the marital
residence

and

damage

to

the

marital

residence

caused

by

unanticipated power outages.
10.

That the original Findings of Fact entered by the trial

court noted in Finding of Fact 29 in pertinent part ••. . . the
Defendant has not been employed outside of the parties home, but is
in all probability now required to seek employment and additional
education and training in order to assist in providirg partial
support for herself and the parties' minor children.11
11.

That the Defendant's itemized monthly expenses total

approximately $4,700 per month which includes a contribution to a
retirement plan which the Court finds is entirely appropriate to
provide retirement income to the Defendant and that even if such
amount were reduced, and certain other items and costs adjusted,
the Defendant is in need of financial support and assistance from
the Plaintiff in order to meet her ongoing monthly expenses.

Such

p.s particularly true given the fact that Court ordered child
support

in

the

sua

of

$1,800

per

month

has

terminated

as

Hereinabove set forth.
12.

That

the

circumstances

of

the

Defendant

have

not

katerially or substantially changed since the entry of the Decree
of Divorce herein i.e., she resides in the same residence that was

the parties' marital residence at the date of divorce; her basic
expenses have not substantially or materially changed; she has
accepted and continuously pursued her employment in order to meet
her monthly expenses and provide for her support and maintenance
and that she has not received and retained substantial funds by way
of

gift

or

inheritance

which

have

altered

or

affected

her

circumstances significantly.
13.

The Court finds that Defendant has retained the services

of counsel to assist her in the defense of the Petition to Modify
the Decree of Divorce and has incurred costs and attorney fees in
connection therewith.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now
concludes as follows:

CQHCLPfllQHfl OF LAW
1.

That

the Court has In persona* and

subject matter

jurisdiction.
2.

J

That the Plaintiff has failed to meet his threshold

burden to show a substantial change in circumstances sufficient to
modify the Decree of Divorce as amended.
3.

That Plaintiff's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce

should be denied.
4.

That counsel for the Defendant should be granted leave to

rile an application for attorneys' fees and costs incurred herein
by way of affidavit for further consideration by the Court and that

i

5

the Plaintiff, by and through his counsel, should be granted leave
to file such opposition thereto ad he shall deem necessary.
5.

That

the

Court

should

make

and

enter

accordingly.
DATED this

day of

, 1998.
BY THE COURT:

PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON

its

order

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I herewith certify that I am a member of and/or employed by
the law firm of CAMPBELL MAACK

& SESSIONS, One Utah Center,

Thirteenth Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah

and

that in said capacity and pursuant to Rule 5(b) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, the foregoing FINDINGS 07 FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 07 LAW
was served upon the plaintiff by placing a true and correct copy
thereof in the U. S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following this
Q) I

j

day of June, 1998:
Michael K. Mohrman, Esq.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2000
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